The 2014 European Parliament elections: divided in unity? by Hobolt, Sara
  
Sara Hobolt  
The 2014 European Parliament elections: 
divided in unity? 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: Hobolt, Sara (2015) The 2014 European Parliament elections: divided in unity? 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies . pp. 1-16. ISSN 0021-9886  
DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12264   
 
©2015 The Author. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/61926/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: July 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or 
other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research 
Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further 
distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may 
freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if 
you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
1 
 
Cover sheet  
The 2014 European Parliament Elections: 
Divided in Unity? 
 
Sara B Hobolt 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
European Institute 
Houghton Street | London WC2A 2AE 
s.b.hobolt@lse.ac.uk 
 
The JCMS Annual Review of 2014 
 
  
2 
 
The 2014 European Parliament Elections: Divided in Unity?1 
SARA B HOBOLT 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
Introduction 
The winners of the 2014 European Parliament elections were Eurosceptic parties, often 
found on the fringes of the political spectrum. Parties critical of, or even hostile to, the 
European Union, topped the polls in France, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Denmark, and 
Greece, gaining almost 30 per cent of the seats in the European Parliament.  Does this 
Eurosceptic surge indicate a rejection of the European project by a growing number of voters 
across Europe?  Was support for these parties a sign that voters wanted less Union, or 
perhaps a different Union? 
This contribution examines the context and the outcome the 2014 European elections.  
Previous elections to the European Parliament (EP) elections have generally been 
characterised by lacklustre and domestically-focused campaigns and voter apathy, but two 
factors set these elections apart: they took place in the context of the worst economic crisis in 
post-war Europe and the political groups in the EP had for the first time nominated lead 
candidates to compete for the post of European Commission president. Many hoped that the 
increased saliency of European issues and the constitutional strengthening of the link 
between the EP ballot and the policy direction of the Commission would both mobilize 
voters to take part in the elections in greater numbers and encourage them to provide a 
democratic mandate for the future direction of the EU. The EP even put up large billboards 
in the run-up to the elections proclaiming ‘This time it’s different’. 
 Were these elections different? On the face of it very little had changed. Turnout 
remained low at 42.6 per cent, government parties were the losers and smaller parties the 
winners, and the introduction of lead candidates European Parliament’s seemed to have 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank the Annual Review editors, Nat Copsey and Tim Haughton, for very 
insightful comments on previous versions of this contribution. 
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gone unnoticed by most citizens (see Hobolt, 2014a; Treib, 2014; Schmitt et al., 2015a). Hence, 
the most European aspect of these elections was that fact that concerns about the EU, and its 
handling of the crisis, dominated the rhetoric in a number of countries and shaped vote 
choices. However, the findings of this study also show considerable variation not only in the 
electoral appeal of Eurosceptic parties across countries, but also in the reasons for voters’ 
support. Whereas the radical right parties performed well in Northern Europe, and to a 
lesser extent in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), they gained only a handful of seats in the 
Member States that were recipients of a credit arrangement, or bailout, from the EU (Cyprus, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). In these debtor states, the critique of the EU was 
expressed by parties on the radical left instead.   
The analysis of individual-level data from the 2014 European Election Studies (EES) 
reveal that support for leftist Eurosceptic parties was not driven by a rejection of the 
European project, but by discontent with austerity policies and a desire for more European 
solidarity. In contrast, support for the anti-EU radical right in the North was more evidently 
motivated by an opposition to immigration and to transfers of funds to other Member States. 
‘Europe’ thus played a more central role in these European elections than ever before, but 
the outcome also exposed deep divisions in opinions on the future of the European Union. 
Citizens who were most vulnerable in the economic downturn – the losers of globalization – 
were most likely to vote for Eurosceptic parties. However, in the richer countries in the 
North, voters adversely affected by the crisis favoured less Union and closed borders, 
whereas similar voters in the South were calling for more European solidarity and 
integration. These contrasting narratives of how to solve the crisis are also evident in the 
national media coverage. The findings of this study thus highlight the challenges facing 
European politicians as they seek to find common solutions to the continent’s problems. 
This contribution proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the political and economic 
context of the 2014 EP elections and the national debate on the EU in the period leading up 
to the vote. Thereafter, it examines the support for Eurosceptic parties and individual-level 
motivations, analysing a cross-national post-electoral survey. Finally, it discusses the 
broader implications of these elections for the future of the EU. 
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European Elections: No Longer Second-Order? 
Elections to the EP ostensibly provide a unique opportunity for the citizens of the EU to 
shape the policies and the future of the Union. When direct elections to the EP were 
introduced in 1979, the hope was that this would enhance the democratic dimension of EU 
policy-making by creating a legislative chamber that was accountable to and representing 
voters’ interests (Rittberger, 2005; Hix et al., 2007). But rather than legitimising the EU’s 
authority, scholars and commentators alike have argued that the EP elections have failed to 
bring about the genuine electoral connection between voters and EU policy-makers that was 
hoped for. At the heart of the problem is the so-called ‘second-order national election’ nature 
of EP elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). According to the 
‘second-order election’ explanation, voters treat EP elections as midterm elections. As a 
consequence, most voters simply do not care enough about these elections to even cast a 
vote. Turnout has declined in successive EP elections from 62 per cent in 1979 to just below 
43 per cent in 2014.2 Those who do turn out to vote tend to use their ballot to punish their 
national incumbent or vote on the basis of policy preferences relevant in a domestic policy 
space, rather than to decide on the issues facing the EU.  
Numerous studies have shown that parties in national government are punished, 
particularly during the (national) midterm, and that larger parties are disadvantaged (see 
e.g. Marsh, 1998; Hix and Marsh, 2007). These patterns of behaviour are generally 
interpreted as voters responding to the low salience context of EP elections, and have led to 
the conclusion that European elections have largely failed in providing a strong democratic 
mandate for policy-making at the EU level. There were good reasons, however, to expect 
that the 2014 European Parliament elections would be different: less ‘second-order national 
elections’ and more truly European contests about the future direction of European 
integration.  The reasons were two-fold: the introduction of ‘lead candidates’ for the position 
of Commission president and the eurozone crisis.  
                                                          
2 However, it is worth noting that this decline in average levels of turnout in EP elections can be 
largely accounted for by the changing composition of the EU electorate due to the multiple EU 
enlargements to countries often with lower turnout habits in general elections, especially in CEE (see 
Franklin, 2001).  
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Starting with the institutional innovations, the EP took advantage of a constitutional 
change in the Lisbon Treaty’s Article 17, which stated that the results of the EP elections 
should be ‘taken into account’ when selecting the next Commission president (see Dinan, 
2014). To reinforce this link between the EP ballot and the selection of the Commission 
president, the major EP political groups decided for the first time to each rally behind a 
common lead candidate (Spitzenkandidat in German) for the post of the next President of the 
European Commission: Jean-Claude Juncker for the European People’s Party (EPP);  Martin 
Schulz for the Party of European Socialists (belonging to the Socialists & Democrats group);  
Guy Verhofstadt for the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), Ska Keller 
and José Bové for  the European Green Party; and finally,  Alexis Tsipras  for the Party of the 
European Left. Thus, in theory at least, the 2014 EP elections allowed voters to give a 
mandate to a specific political platform for the EU’s executive body, the Commission, since a 
vote for these parties was also a vote for one of the lead candidates as Commission 
President. 3 The Parliament’s hope was that this would strengthen the European element in 
the campaigns, personalize the distant Brussels bureaucracy, and thereby increase interest 
and participation in European democracy (European Parliament, 2013; Hobolt, 2014a).   
The second factor making these elections different from previous ones was the 
economic and political context. At the time of the elections in June 2014, the EU had been 
experiencing several years of severe economic crisis. The euro area’s sovereign debt 
problems became increasing evident in 2009 with the downgrading of government debt in 
many European states, particularly in the so-called ‘GIIPS’ countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain). Concerns intensified in early 2010 and thereafter, leading the EU to 
implement a series of financial support measures such as the European Financial Stability 
Facility (subsequently the European Stability Mechanism).4 These euro-rescue measures 
targeted at helping countries in a severe sovereign debt crisis came with strings attached, 
including government promises of fiscal austerity and structural reforms. A series of new 
legal instruments (the Six Pack, the Two Pack, the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure), 
new decision-making procedures (the European Semester) and a new intergovernmental 
                                                          
3 On the appointment of the new President of the Commission see Dinan’s contribution to this 
volume. 
4 On eurozone governance see Hodson’s contribution to this and previous issues of the Annual Review.  
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treaty, the Fiscal Compact, were aimed at more tightly constraining national fiscal policy-
making.  The ongoing attempts to rescue countries on the brink of bankruptcy, and avoid 
the collapse of the eurozone, and the more formal institutional changes to economic 
governance, were extensively covered in the national media across Europe. The following 
section looks at the coverage of Europe in the media and the shifting public mood. 
 
The Debate on Europe: Converging or Diverging? 
As a consequence of the euro crisis, the EU issue became more salient in the national public 
spheres than ever before. This manifested itself in two ways. On the one hand, the public 
debate on the crisis was more ‘Europeanised’ than previously. Across Europe, the national 
media debated similar issues, and European actors (such as Angela Merkel and José Manuel 
Barroso) were prominent in the media landscapes across Europe (see Kriesi and Grande, 
2014). On the other hand, domestic media coverage continued to be characterised by distinct 
national perspective on the crisis, and the EP election campaigns were also dominated by 
national parties and national politicians.  
Moreover, there were elements of the campaign debate pointing towards increasing 
divisiveness and disintegration, as the national discourses on the crisis diverged. Studies on 
how the euro crisis has been portrayed in the media have pointed to the clear manifestations 
of a ‘blame game’, with the different interpretations of who is to blame for the crisis (Hänska 
et al., 2013; Reuters Institute, 2014). For instance, in Southern Europe, the hardship and 
unemployment of the euro crisis are often linked to the conditions associated with bailout 
agreements, attributed largely to Germany. In contrast, parts of the media in North 
European countries, e.g. Germany and Finland, have highlighted that GIIPS countries have 
themselves to blame for the crisis. A large-scale study of media coverage of the euro crisis 
directed by the Oxford Reuters Institute5 provides insights into who the national 
newspapers portrayed as ‘bearing the main responsibility to solve the crisis’ in the period 
between 2010 and 2012 (see Table 1). Interestingly, the national studies reveal a relatively 
                                                          
5  “The Euro Crisis, Media Coverage, and Perceptions of Europe within the EU”-project was directed 
by the Oxford Reuters Institute. More than 10,000 articles from 40 newspapers in 9 countries were 
analysed in the project, between 2010 and 2012. 
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convergent view that the European Union bears the main responsibility for solving the 
crisis, either the eurozone countries (44 per cent) or the EU as a whole (28 per cent). In some 
countries’ media coverage, debtor countries themselves are also seen to bear the 
responsibility. That is a view found mainly in coverage in Finland, Germany and Belgium, 
and perhaps more surprisingly, in Spain. A much smaller proportion of news coverage also 
points to ‘creditor’ countries as the main culprit, whereas the IMF, banks and other lenders 
are mentioned far less frequently (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Media coverage of who bears the main responsibility for solving the crisis (%) 
  Belgium Finland France Germany Italy 
The 
Netherlands 
Poland Spain UK 
Euro group 44 57 60 37 35 60 26 22 53 
EU/European Central 
Bank 
29 19 15 18 34 16 50 35 30 
Countries with 
sovereign debt problems 
20 22 12 22 21 16 9 28 10 
Countries without 
sovereign debt problems 
1 0 6 13 5 3 11 14 3 
IMF, banks and other 
lenders 
6 2 7 10 5 5 4 1 4 
Note: Percent of articles on the crisis that mention an “actor” with main responsibility for solving the crisis. Excludes 
“none” and “others”. 
Source: Reuters Institute (2014)  
  
The studies of the media coverage in the years leading up to the 2014 elections thus point to 
an increasingly integrated Europeanised public sphere where the same European issues, 
European actors and EU responsibility appeared prominently in the news coverage across 
Member States. However, the national framing also remained dominant and the crisis was 
viewed from a distinct national perspective (see Kriesi and Grande, 2014; Reuters Institute, 
2014).  
Not surprisingly, the EU’s response to the crisis also affected citizens’ attitudes 
towards the European Union. Survey data show that citizens became increasingly aware of 
the Euro crisis and more likely to hold the EU, rather than their national governments, 
responsible for the economic circumstances in their country in the period leading up to the 
2014 elections (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Hobolt, 2014b). At the same time, Eurobarometer 
data show there was a marked decline in trust in the European Union. Between the 2009 and 
2014 elections, the percentage of people who ‘tend to trust’ the EU, declined by 16 
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percentage points from 47 to 31 per cent, and similarly those who had a positive image of 
the EU declined from 45 to 35 per cent.6 While trust in national governments also declined in 
the same period, this decline was less steep. But how did these developments in the 
institutional procedures, the campaigns and people’s attitudes towards Europe translate into 
voting behaviour in the 2014 elections?  
 
Voting Behaviour in the 2014 Elections 
Given the rise in salience of European integration, and the strengthened link between the 
vote and executive politics in the EU, it was not unreasonable to expect that voters would be 
more motivated to turn out than in previous elections. While initial indications suggested a 
small increase in turnout, participation levels were in fact slightly below 2009 level. Hence, 
although the EP was successful in ensuring that the lead candidate of the winning political 
group (EPP), Jean-Claude Juncker, eventually became Commission president, it is less 
obvious that the introduction of lead candidates made a substantial difference to voting 
behaviour. Evidence suggests that the lead candidates did have a mobilizing effect on the 
minority of voters who had knowledge of the candidates, especially in countries where they 
had campaigned (see Schmitt et al., 2015a). However, only a minority of Europeans were 
able to identify which political party the candidates belong to – only 19 and 17 per cent 
could link Juncker and Schulz to their parties, respectively - and hence for the vast majority 
of citizens, these candidates made little difference (see also Hobolt, 2014a).   
There was significant variation across the EU in levels of participation, as shown in 
Figure 1. Most of that variation can be explained by three factors that are not directly related 
to the European nature of the elections, namely: compulsory voting rules, concurrent 
national and relatively recent history of Communist rule. The most powerful predictor of 
turnout at European elections is compulsory voting (Belgium, Cyprus, Greece and 
Luxembourg) or a history of compulsory voting (Italy). It is well-known that compulsory 
voting raises turnout, even when it is not strictly enforced, especially in low-salience 
elections (Franklin, 2001). A second factor is concurrent national elections that bring voters 
to the polls, such as the national and regional elections in Belgium and the presidential 
                                                          
6 See Eurobarometer surveys 2007-2014. 
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elections in Lithuania (the latter helps explain the remarkable 21 percentage points increase 
in turnout compared to 2009). Finally, turnout in post-communist countries is significantly 
lower than in the rest of the Union. The may be due in part to general low levels of 
partisanship and political mobilization in these countries (Wessels and Franklin, 2009) and 
the fact that Europe is an even less salient issue in Central and Eastern Europe (Haughton, 
2014; Haughton and Novotna, 2014).  
Figure 1: Turnout in the 2014 European Parliament elections 
 
Source: European Parliament (www.europarl.europa.eu) 
 
While there was no great leap in participation levels, that is not to say that these elections 
were not distinctly more ‘European’ than in previous ones. At a first glance, the outcome of 
the election appears very similar to the 2009 elections: the centre-right EPP remained the 
largest party, but was also the elections’ biggest loser as its seat share dropped from 36 to 29 
per cent; followed closely by its centre-left rival, the Socialists & Democrats with 25 per cent 
(the same as in 2009). The 8th European Parliament also includes the centrist ALDE group 
with 9 per cent (down from 11 per cent in 2009) and the Greens with 7 per cent of the seats 
(as in 2009). The clearest winners, however, were parties that belong to the groups more 
sceptical of the EU:  on the right – the European Conservatives and Reformists group (9 per 
cent, up from 7 in 2009) and the European Freedom and Direct Democracy group (6 per cent, 
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up from 4) – and on the left - the United Left Group (7 per cent, up from 5) – as well as the 52 
members (7 per cent, up from 4), who are not attached to any grouping. 
The clearest indication that voters were more concerned about European issues was 
the surge in popularity for political parties that proposed radical reform of, or even exit 
from, the EU. The rise in the Eurosceptic vote was therefore the message that dominated the 
headlines in the aftermath of the EP elections, and sent shock waves through domestic 
political systems. The most striking result was that radical right Eurosceptic parties, which 
had never been in government, topped the polls in France, the UK and Denmark. This was 
not an isolated phenomenon. With the exception of Malta, all EU countries had a 
Eurosceptic party gaining more than 2 per cent of the popular vote, although with 
considerable cross-national differences in their level of popularity. Overall, 220 of the EP’s 
751 members (MEPs) represented Eurosceptic parties, accounting for 29 per cent of MEPs, as 
shown in Table 2.   
Of course not all Eurosceptic parties are the same. Euroscepticism may be broadly 
deﬁned as a sentiment of disapproval towards European integration, and this classification 
of Eurosceptic parties includes both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties (Taggart and 
Szczerbiak, 2004). Soft Eurosceptic parties refer to those that accept the idea of European 
integration, but oppose specific policies or institutional aspects of the EU, such as Syriza in 
Greece, the Conservative Party in Britain or Fidesz7 in Hungary. Hard Eurosceptic parties 
include parties that reject the European integration project as such, and tend to advocate a 
country’s withdrawal from the EU, such as the Freedom Party in Austria and the UK 
Independence Party in Britain (see Treib, 2014). The parties classified as Eurosceptic in Table 
2 belong to both categories and have been included in the list because a significant 
proportion of their campaign rhetoric and manifesto was devoted to a critique of the EU.8 
Most Eurosceptic parties are found on the fringes of the left-right political spectrum, 
although a few adopt more centrist positions (such as the British Conservative Party and the 
                                                          
7 Fidesz is unusual among Eurosceptic parties, as it belongs the pro-European EPP, however, its 
leader Victor Orbán’s  rhetoric has become increasingly hostile towards the EU (for example, he 
compared EU bureaucrats to Soviet apparatchiks). Orbán has described his position as ‘Eurorealist’ 
rather than Eurosceptic. 
8 The classification has been cross-referenced with expert judgements in the Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey, as well as other academic work on Eurosceptic parties, notably Treib (2014). 
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Polish Law and Justice party) or reject any left-right classification (such as the Italian Five 
Star Movement).  
Table 2: Eurosceptic Parties in the 2014 European Parliament elections 
Country Parties* 
Eurosceptic 
Left vote % 
MEPs 
Eurosceptic 
Right vote % 
MEPs 
Austria 
Freedom Party  [R], EUStop  [R], Coalition for another 
Europe [L] 
2.1 0 22.5 4 
Belgium Vlaams Belang [R]; PTB-GO! [L] 2.0 0 4.3 1 
Bulgaria 
VMRO-BND/Bulgaria without Censorship [R]**, National 
Front [R], ATAKA [R] 
- - 16.7 2 
Croatia Croatian Party of Rights [R] - - ** 1 
Cyprus Progressive Party of Working People [L];  ELAM [R] 27.0 2 2.7 0 
Czech 
Republic 
Communist Party [L]; Party of Free Citizens [R]; Dawn of 
Direct Democracy [R] 
11.0 3 8.4 1 
Denmark 
Danish People's Party [R]; People's Movement against the 
EU [L] 
8.1 1 26.6 4 
Estonia Conservative People's Party of Estonia [R] - - 4.0 0 
Finland Finns Party [R] - - 12.9 2 
France National Front [R]; Left Front [L]; France Arise [R] 6.3 3 28.7 23 
Germany 
Alternative for Germany [R]; Left Party [L]; National 
Democratic Party [R] 
7.4 7 8.1 8 
Greece 
Syriza [L]; Golden Dawn [R]; KKE [L]; ANEL [R]; Popular 
Orthodox Rally [R] 
32.7 8 15.5 4 
Hungary Fidesz [R]; JOBBIK [R] - - 66.1 15 
Ireland Sinn Fein [L] 19.5 3 - - 
Italy 
Five Star Movement [R]****; Northern League [R];  The 
Other Europe with Tsipras [L] 
4.0 3 27.3 22 
Latvia National Alliance [R]; Union of Greens and Farmers  [R] - - 22.5 2 
Lithuania Order and Justice [R]; LLRA [R] - - 22.3 3 
Luxembourg Alternative for Democratic Reform [R] - - 7.5 0 
Malta - - - - - 
Netherlands Freedom Party [R]; Socialist Party [L]; CU-SGP [R] 9.6 2 21.0 6 
Poland 
Law and Justice [R]; Congress of the New Right [R]; United 
Poland [R]; Right Wing of the Republic [R] 
- - 42.9 23 
Portugal United Democratic Coalition  [L]; Left Bloc [L] 18.6 4 - - 
Romania 
People's Party - Dan Diaconescu [L]; Greater Romania 
Party [R] 
3.7 0 2.7 0 
Slovakia 
Ordinary People and Independent Personalities [R]; Nova 
[R]; Freedom and Solidarity [R]; Slovak National Party [R] 
- - 24.6 3 
Slovenia United Left [L]; Slovenian National Party [R] 5.5 0 4.0 0 
Spain United Left [L]; Podemos [L];  Peoples Decide [L] 20.1 12 - - 
Sweden Sweden Democrats [R]; Left Party [L] 6.3 1 9.7 2 
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United 
Kingdom 
UKIP [R]; Conservative Party [R]; Sinn Fein [L]; 
Democratic Unionist Party  [R] 
0.7 1 50.6 44 
Total MEPs     50   170 
Notes: 
* Only parties with more than 2% of the national vote or 1 MEP have been included 
** VMRO-BND formed a coalition with Bulgaria Without Censorship, a soft Eurosceptic party, and other smaller 
parties, and their 2 MEPs joined the Eurosceptic ECR Group. 
***Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević (HPS AS) formed an electoral alliance with 3 other parties. The HSP AS 
member sits in the ECR group, whereas the other coalition members sit in the EPP Group. The coalition got 41% of 
the votes 
 
While these parties share a critical, or even hostile, attitude to the European Union, 
they vary considerably the nature of their position on the left-right spectrum and therefore 
also in their views on other issues, such as redistribution, immigration and civil liberties. 
The left-right positions also translate into differences in the critique of the EU. The right-
wing criticism is traditionally centred on nationalism and thus an opposition to the external 
threats to national sovereignty and to immigration (Mudde, 2007; Mair and Mudde, 1998). In 
contrast, critique from left-wing parties of the EU is rooted in an anti-capitalist ideology and 
call for greater state intervention and redistribution both nationally and internationally. 
However, while much divides the radical right and the radical left, they share a Eurosceptic, 
nationalist, and often populist, rhetoric that cuts across traditional left-right alignments 
(Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). In the context of the 2014 EP elections, the concern about threats 
to national sovereignty and opposition to EU institutions and policies were shared by 
Eurosceptic parties on both the right and the left, often combined with populist and anti-
establishment rhetoric. However, the anti-immigration rhetoric was far more pronounced on 
the right (especially in Western Europe), while the anti-austerity rhetoric was more 
pronounced on the left. 
As shown in Table 2, the majority of Eurosceptic parties are found on the right, often 
on the far right. The popularity of radical right-wing Eurosceptic parties is particularly 
pronounced in Northern Europe creditor states: Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland 
and the UK.  In other words, in the richer Member States that have generally benefited the 
most from the Single Market, but where there has also been a significant increase in social 
inequality (Copsey, 2015). The Eurosceptic right also did very well in Italy and France, as 
well as in CEE, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia.  Yet we also saw 
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the success of the radical left Eurosceptic parties in a handful of countries. Interestingly, the 
Eurosceptic left did well in the countries that experienced the most severe anti-austerity 
programmes and conditionality associated with their bailout packages, namely in Greece, 
Cyprus, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, where the parties polled an average of 24 per cent.   
 These voting data clearly demonstrate the heightened appeal of Eurosceptic parties 
in the 2014 EP elections. Moreover, they point to important North-South and East-West 
differences: in the richer North, the radical right parties performed very well. In the poorer 
South-West (and Ireland), where the EU had imposed conditions of austerity and structural 
reform in return of credit, radical left parties did well; whereas there was a notable absence 
of radical right parties. In CEE, the Eurosceptic parties on the right generally performed 
well, although voter apathy was more pronounced than vocal Euroscepticism in this part of 
Europe (see Haughton and Novotna, 2014).  These aggregate-level data, however, tell us less 
about the motivation of voters across Europe. In the next section, I analyse individual-level 
data to address the question of why Eurosceptic parties were popular. 
 
Explaining the Eurosceptic vote 
What explains support for Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 EP elections? As discussed above, 
the classic explanation for voting behaviour in European elections is the ‘second-order 
national election’ explanation (Reif and Schmitt, 1980 p. 9; see also van der Eijk and Franklin, 
1996; Hix and Marsh, 2007). In comparison to first-order national elections, where the 
formation of a government is a primary objective, strategic considerations about party size 
and government performance matter less in second-order EP elections, and consequently 
voters are expected to vote more ‘sincerely’, focusing on ideological similarities.  Moreover, 
voters may be motivated by a desire to punish national governments. Yet recent work on 
electoral behaviour in Europe has argued that the issue of European integration is becoming 
increasingly politicised and this has meant that the issue of European integration matters 
more to voters (Tillman, 2004; De Vries, 2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Studies of the 2004 
and 2009 elections have shown that Euroscepticism plays a considerable role in voters’ 
decision to defect and abstain, but that this is conditioned by the politicisation of the EU 
14 
 
issue in the national political debate (Hobolt et al., 2009; de Vries et al., 2011; Hobolt and 
Spoon, 2012).  Hence the extant literature highlights three sets of factors which shape vote 
choices in EP elections: first, sincere ideological considerations, such as left-right and 
libertarian-authoritarian attitudes; second, dissatisfaction with the current (national) 
government and policy performance; and finally, attitudes that are specifically related to the 
European Union and European integration. 
Electoral behaviour in EP elections is therefore often regarded as a ‘protest vote’: a 
protest against the incumbent national government or indeed against the direction of 
European integration. Since these elections remain ‘second-order’ they allow voters to 
express their dissatisfaction with the political establishment and policy performance without 
the constraints that voters feel when they are selecting a national government. Yet, this does 
not render the elections insignificant. EP elections matter, not only for policy-making in the 
EU, but also as barometers of citizens’ preferences and as ‘markers’ in national politics. In 
the context of an economic crisis in Europe, the fact that voters endorsed parties on the 
fringes of the political spectrum therefore seems unsurprising. But it still leaves several 
questions unanswered: if the rise of parties on the fringes were a protest vote, what were 
voters protesting against? How does this vary across Europe?  
 These questions can be addressed by analysing the European Election Study (EES) 
2014; a post-election survey with representative samples in each of the 28 Member States 
(Schmitt et al., 2015b).9 This study allows us to examine the factors that motivated citizens 
to support Eurosceptic parties across the EU. We examine support for both left-wing and 
right-wing Eurosceptic parties by analysing responses to the EES question ‘how probable it 
is that you will ever vote for this party?’ on an 11-point scale. The distinct advantage of this 
question is that we are able to measure support for Eurosceptic parties among all 
respondents and not just those who voted in the EP elections.10 To examine the 
                                                          
9 Approximately 1,100 respondents were interviewed in each EU member country, totalling 30,064 
respondents. The EES 2014 was carried out by TNS Opinion between 30 May and 27 June 2014. All 
the interviews were carried out face to face. More information can be found here: 
http://eeshomepage.net/voter-study-2014/, where the EES questionnaire can also be found. 
10 I also ran the models with vote choice in EP elections as the dependent variable (1= Eurosceptic 
Left/ Eurosceptic Right party) and the same explanatory variables come out as significant in these 
models). 
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determinants of Eurosceptic vote choice, we firstly measure individuals’ socio-economic 
position by including a set of demographic variables (gender, age, education,11 
occupation12 and unemployment) as well a variable capturing individuals adversely 
affected by the crisis.13 Second, we include a variable that capture individual’s ideological 
attitudes towards the government14 and the economy.15 Third, we capture ideology using 
questions on economic redistribution, immigration, and combating crime versus civil 
liberties16. Finally, we include various questions that capture attitudes toward European 
integration17 and EU policies on trans-national redistribution,18 fiscal integration19 as well 
as approval of EU performance during the crisis.20 We also include a measure of (objective) 
knowledge of the European Union.21 
 Table 3 shows the results from a multilevel linear regression model of Eurosceptic 
party support with random intercepts for political system.22 I have run separate models 
for left- and right-wing Eurosceptic parties (see Table 2) and for Western Europe - with 
more established party systems and longer democratic traditions – and post-Communist 
CEE, with less established party systems and lower salience of EU issues (Haughton, 2014; 
Haughton and Novotna, 2014). The results show both striking similarities and important 
differences across support for Eurosceptic parties (left and right) and regions (West and 
CEE).  
Starting with the similarities, we can see that people who are economically 
                                                          
11 Age of ending full-time education 
12 Dummies for respondents in a working class occupation (unskilled or skilled manual labour) and in 
a professional/ managerial position.  
13 Loss of income and/or loss of job in the household over the last 24 months.  
14 Disapproval of “The government’s record to date” 
15 General economic situation over the next 12 month in country. 
16 Opposition to the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in country; Opposition to a 
restrictive policy on immigration; In favour of restricting privacy rights to combat crime 
17 Opposition to “European unification” 
18 Disagreement with the statement: “In times of crisis, it is desirable for the UK to give financial help 
to another European Union Member State facing severe economic and financial difficulties.” 
19 Opposition to EU authority over the EU Member States' economic and budgetary policies 
20 Disapproval of The actions of the EU during the last 12 months 
21 A scale based on correct responses to six factual knowledge questions on the EU and the lead 
candidates. 
22 Estimating the models with country fixed-effects or clustered standard errors by country yield very 
similar results. 
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disadvantaged are more likely to support the Eurosceptic parties: those in working class 
occupations, the unemployed and those who have been adversely affected by the crisis. In 
other words, it is the ‘losers’ of European integration, and globalization, who are most 
attracted to Eurosceptic parties – and there are a lot of them as a result of the uneven 
distribution of the Single Market’s benefits over the past 30 years (Copsey, 2015). It is also 
noteworthy that supporters of these parties are generally dissatisfied with the 
performance of both their national government and the European Union. This suggests 
that the Eurosceptic vote is a classic protest against the political establishment among 
those who feel that that mainstream parties have let them down, and those who have 
suffered most in the crisis. 
 
Table 3: Explaining the Eurosceptic Vote 
  Eurosceptic Right Eurosceptic Left 
 
West East West East 
  Coef SE Sig Coef SE Sig Coef SE Sig Coef SE   
Female -0.49 0.05 ** -0.12 0.06 ** 0.05 0.06 
 
-0.14 0.13 
 
Age -0.01 0.00 ** -0.02 0.00 ** -0.02 0.00 ** 0.02 0.00 ** 
Education -0.14 0.04 ** 0.06 0.05   0.08 0.04 
 
-0.38 0.11 ** 
Professional 
occupation 
-0.18 0.09 
 
-0.26 0.12 ** -0.36 0.11 ** -0.75 0.29 ** 
Working class 
occupation 
0.47 0.09 ** 0.15 0.09   0.23 0.10 ** 0.28 0.18 
 
Unemployed 0.10 0.10 
 
-0.18 0.10   0.09 0.10 
 
0.53 0.23 ** 
Adversely affected 
by the crisis 
0.09 0.04 ** 0.07 0.04 ** 0.10 0.04 ** 0.26 0.07 ** 
EU knowledge -0.04 0.02 
 
0.14 0.03 ** 0.15 0.02 ** -0.13 0.06 ** 
Government 
disapproval 
0.19 0.03 ** -0.02 0.03   0.43 0.03 ** 0.13 0.06 ** 
Economic 
pessimism 
0.08 0.03 ** -0.08 0.04 ** -0.02 0.03 
 
0.02 0.08 
 
Anti civil liberties 0.08 0.01 ** 0.03 0.01 ** -0.04 0.01 ** 0.04 0.02  
Anti redistribution 
(national) 
0.09 0.01 ** 0.01 0.01   -0.20 0.01 ** 0.01 0.02 
 
Anti immigration 0.16 0.01 ** 0.00 0.01   -0.11 0.01 ** -0.03 0.02  
Anti EU 
unification 
0.10 0.01 ** 0.02 0.01 ** 0.00 0.01 
 
0.03 0.02 
 
EU performance 
disapproval 
0.16 0.04 ** -0.13 0.04 ** 0.17 0.04 ** 0.17 0.08 ** 
Anti EU 
redistribution  
0.33 0.03 ** -0.09 0.03 ** -0.26 0.03 ** -0.17 0.07 ** 
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Anti EU fiscal 
integration 
0.08 0.01 ** -0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01 
 
-0.02 0.02 
 
Constant -0.84 0.27 ** 2.92 0.35 ** 4.58 0.33 ** 1.85 0.57 ** 
N, groups 13,481     10,124     13,062     2285     
Note: Multi-level logistic regression of propensity to vote for Eurosceptic parties (see Table 1).  ** 
p<0.05. Source: EES 2014 
 
 Turning to the differences, we notice that the ideological motivations for supporting 
these parties vary considerable across party types and region.  To illustrate the magnitude of 
these differences, Figure 2 shows that marginal effects (min-max) of each of the significant 
explanatory variables on Eurosceptic party support (0-10). When it comes to left-right 
preferences, it is perhaps unsurprising supporters of right-wing parties in the West are 
opposed to both redistribution and immigration, whereas support for left-wing Eurosceptic 
parties in the West is driven by a contrasting set of attitudes: favouring immigration and 
redistribution from rich to the poor. In contrast, in CEE these ideological considerations 
were far less significant as a predictor of party support23 (see Figure 2b and 2d). Figure 2a 
shows that anti-immigration attitudes were the most important driver of right-wing 
Eurosceptic support, whereas Figure 2c shows that pro-redistribution attitudes were the key 
motivation behind left-wing Eurosceptic support. This is of course also a reflection of the 
rhetoric and policy positions of these parties. Right-wing Eurosceptic parties in the West 
have been able to successfully link their opposition to the EU to more salient concerns about 
immigration (from inside and outside the EU), whereas left-wing Eurosceptic parties have 
related their critique of the EU policies to a more general anti-austerity platform.  
 Most interesting is the relationship between EU attitudes and the support for 
Eurosceptic parties. One might have expected that Euroscepticism is a key predictor of both 
right- and left-wing party support, given that a distinguishing feature of these parties is 
their critical position on European integration. However, that is not the case. We find a 
strong association between Euroscepticism - opposition to European unification and 
opposition to specific EU policies – among supporters of right-wing Eurosceptic parties in 
                                                          
23 But note that pro-redistribution attitudes are a significant predictor of left-wing Eurosceptic party 
support also in CEE. 
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the West. However, general attitudes towards European integration are not a significant 
predictor of support for left-wing Eurosceptic parties, such as Syriza and Podemos. If 
anything, supporters of these parties are more pro-European than mainstream party 
supporters. Moreover, they clearly favour greater financial transfers between EU Member 
States (a preference shared with supporters of right-wing Eurosceptic parties in CEE). 
Supporters of left-wing Eurosceptic parties in the West are also far more knowledgeable 
about the EU than the average voter.  
Hence, far from being disengaged and anti-European, the findings suggest that the 
Eurosceptic left-wing vote in the West is a call for a different Europe with greater solidarity 
and redistribution across and within European borders. Supporters of Eurosceptic parties in 
the East also favour greater European redistribution and a critical stance’s on the EU’s 
handling of the crisis. In contrast, supporters of Eurosceptic right-wing parties in the West 
favour closed borders, less integration and less redistribution.  
 
Figure 2: The Eurosceptic Voter 
a) Support for right-wing Eurosceptic parties (West) 
 
 
 
b) Support for right-wing Eurosceptic parties (East) 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Economic pessimist
EU performance disapproval
Government disapproval
Education (lower)
Working class
Male
Age (younger)
Anti EU fiscal integration
Anti civil liberty
Anti redistribution (national)
Anti EU unification
Anti EU redistribution
Anti immigration
Marginal effect on party support  
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c) Support for left-wing Eurosceptic parties (West) 
 
d) Support for left-wing Eurosceptic parties (East) 
 
 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Male
Adversely affected by crisis
Working class
EU performance disapproval
Anti EU unification
Pro EU redistribution
Anti EU fiscal integration
Anti civil liberty
Economic optimism
EU knowledge (higher)
Age (younger)
Marginal effect on party support  
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Adversely affected by crisis
Working class
Disapprove EU action
Pro civil liberties
Pro EU redistribution
Government disapproval
EU knowledge (high)
Age (younger)
Pro immigration
Pro redistribution (national)
Marginal effect on party support  
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Government disapproval
Pro EU redistribution
Working class
Adversely affected by crisis
Unemployed
EU knowledge (lower)
Age (older)
Education (lower)
Marginal effect on party support  
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Conclusion 
Many inside the European institutions had high hopes for the 2014 European Parliament 
elections, as they marked the introduction of genuine contests between candidates for the 
Commission presidency. However, evidence suggests that these lead candidates were 
recognised by only a small proportion of the electorate. Instead of a contest between 
candidates with competing visions for Europe, the elections were dominated by national 
parties and the key ‘European’ feature of these elections was the success of parties that were 
highly critical of the EU. Eurosceptic parties won 29 per cent of the seats in the EP, and 
topped the polls in several countries. 
 The success of these parties is not wholly surprising in the context of a deep 
economic crisis for which the EU was held at least partly responsible by the media and by 
ordinary citizens (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Kriesi and Grande, 2014; Reuters Institute, 2014).  
In the period leading up to the elections, unemployment rates for the EU reached a post-war 
high. The situation was particularly grave in the debtor states, such as Greece and Spain 
where a quarter of the workforce was excluded from the labour market and youth 
unemployment was even higher. As a result of this crisis and policy measures adopted in 
response to the crisis, the EU was more salient than ever in the national media. Yet this 
Europeanised public debate was accompanied by distinct national narratives of the crisis 
and blame-shifting to the EU and other countries. In response, citizens become more critical 
of the EU, and trust in mainstream parties and national government also declined. This 
contribution has investigated whether the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties on the 
fringes of the left-right spectrum is an expression of protest against national governments 
and parties, as the second-order election theory would predict, or whether voters cast their 
ballots with distinctly European questions in mind.  
Of course, national and European politics is inherently intertwined, which makes it 
difficult to distinguish between ‘national’ and ‘European’ preferences. Nonetheless, our 
analysis of individual-level voting behaviour suggests that the success of Eurosceptic parties 
was driven, at least in part, by distinctly European concerns, especially in Western Europe. 
First, we find that those individuals who were most vulnerable in the crisis were most likely 
to support Eurosceptic parties.  Our analysis shows that the support for Eurosceptic parties 
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was particularly high among those adversely affected by the crisis (the unemployed, the 
young, the manual workers and those who experience a reduction in income etc.). Second, 
the findings show that supporters of Eurosceptic parties share a disapproval of both national 
government and the EU’s performance during the crisis.  
 Importantly, however, our analysis also point to significant differences. In the richer 
North the far-right general performed better, driven by opposition to immigration as well as 
to a closer integration EU and transfers of resources to other Member States. In contrast, 
support for the left-wing Eurosceptic parties was most pronounced in the Southern 
European countries that were hit hardest by the crisis and received credit from the EU and 
other lenders. Supporters of these parties were not adverse to closer European integration 
and favoured a Europe of greater redistribution, across and within countries, and more open 
borders. Thus while disapproval of the EU’s handling of the crisis seem to unite these voters 
of the left and the right, their vision for a better Europe is radically different.  
Hence, the 2014 EP elections may well have been the most ‘European’ electoral 
contests to date, yet they also revealed deepening divisions in Europe, between the winners 
and the losers of economic integration, and between South and North and East and West.  
The legitimacy of European Union has always rested on the idea that it brought about 
greater prosperity for all its Member States rather than substantial redistribution between 
Member States. The euro crisis has called this basic premise into question not only due the 
severity of the economic downturn, but because of the evident need for financial support, at 
least in the short term, for some Member States, especially poorer Southern European 
countries from the richer neighbours in the North (Copsey, 2015). The electoral appeal of 
Eurosceptic parties in the North calling for less solidarity, contrasted with the demand for 
more solidarity by popular Eurosceptic parties in the South, starkly illustrates the difficulty 
of establishing closer fiscal integration in the Union without further alienating a large group 
of voters. 
The success of the Eurosceptic parties is unlikely to transform policy-making in the 
European Parliament, where the pro-European centrist political groups continue to 
dominate. However, the results did send shock waves through a number of national 
political systems, by giving radical parties an important foothold and by signalling to 
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governments that many voters wanted a different direction for Europe. The fact that the 
visions for reform of the EU differ so radically across (and within) nations point to the 
challenges ahead when it comes to finding common solutions for Europe. Rather than being 
‘united in diversity’, as the EU’s motto proclaims,  the elections highlight that Europeans are 
increasingly ‘divided in unity’: they have been forced closer together, politically and 
economically,  by the necessities of the eurozone crisis, yet this has only accentuated the lack 
of a common European outlook and the fragility of European solidarity.  
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